PART VI - Special Comments and Information
A. Surface gunnery operations - No remarks
B. Air operations - No remarks
C. Amphibious operations - No remarks
D. Special Comments.
Since the BUSH was on radar picket station, C.I.C. was responsible for picking up, tracking, and reporting enemy aircraft to CTF 51 as well as maintaining a plot of all aircraft in the area. In addition, an alert surface radar and sound search for enemy surface craft and submarines was carried out. If enemy planes closed to gun range, it was the duty of C.I.C. to coach gun control on target. The evaluator furnished a constant flow of information to the bridge and advised the commanding officer as to next probable target.
2) Employment and Performance.
(a) Tracking of air targets was no problem. Little interference from land was experienced.
(b) Air and surface radars were in excellent operating condition. The SGa was particularly valuable in picking up low flying planes even with automatic sweep. Such targets showed up well on bridge 12" PPI.
(c) Mk. 4 radar is satisfactory in partial radar control but it is felt that better results would have been obtained during darkness with Mk. 12 and Mk. 22 equipment.
(d) No shore bombardment carried out.
(e) SGa used extensively for navigation with good results.
(f) Station keeping with SGa and bridge PPI very satisfactory.
(g) Targets were primarily aircraft. Operator was able to establish approximate number of planes in each group with surprising accuracy.
(3) Special Techniques
It was found that the SG would pick up low flying planes in automatic sweep and, in order to keep positions of supporting ship on the PPI, manual sweep was used only in special circumstances.
(4) IFF worked very well although the usual difficulty with the PBM plane was encountered.
BUSH was fortunate in having a special radar officer aboard as part of the Fighter Direction Team. This Officer handled all upkeep and maintenance in excellent manner. The fact that BUSH was able in most cases to detect enemy planes in advance of the other northern pickets attests to his work. It is felt that phantoms discussed elsewhere in this report were weather phenomena.
(6) Internal communications were excellent. Enemy jamming on IFD (2096 voice) and TBS did not interfere appreciably with good external communications.
E. Fighter Direction.
The BUSH had a special Fighter Direction Team embarked throughout the operation. This team was assigned control of aircraft at four different tines for short periods. No records are available but the following are noted:
(1)Fade charts for SC-2 radar were fairly accurate for altitude determination and with the Mk.4 picking up targets at 24 miles early estimates of altitude were possible.
(2)Single enemy planes apparently on weather and reconnaissance flights seemed to approach in the clouds and although CAP was stacked at "mattress" and "quilt" it was difficult in cloudy weather to make interceptions.
(3) The aforementioned single aircraft were tracked at high speeds and in one case when "Tally-Ho" was made by BUSH CAP the F6F's could not catch up with the enemy planes even though using maximum speed.
(4) In the afternoon on which the ship was sunk, control of four aircraft was passed to BUSH after the raids had been picked up and had closed to 25 miles. A quick vector resulted in interception of Raid One but there were not enough planes to handle all four raids.
(5) At other times when control of, a CAP was passed to BUSH it was already too late to make an interception, the enemy had in most cases passed and was headed for the transport area.
(6) Visual fighter direction was ordered by the commanding officer in the afternoon of the 6th when it became apparent that the raids were headed for the ship in Radar Picket Station No. 1 as evidence by their tracks. C.I.C. and the Fighter Direction Team were in the process of carrying out the order when the ship was hit.
F. Radar Countermeasures.
(1) Records were lost but it is remembered that at various times while on radar picket station enemy radar signals evaluated as emanating from shore based air search radar were reported by BUSH to CTF 51.
(2) No radar jamming was experienced.
(3)(a) On the evening of April 3rd at about 2200 a group a group of enemy, planes closed and dropped window around the ship at a range of ten to thirteen miles, completely blocking the SC-2 screen. The window appeared on the Mk. 4 screen and only by judicious tracking was gun control able to distinguish between true and false targets. The window dissipated in about 20-3O minutes. (3)(b) Raid No. 1 of the afternoon of April 6 dropped some window but not extensively enough to hamper operation of the SC-2 or Mk. 4 radars. Use of window in high visibility at close range seems to offer no advantage to the enemy and its use is not understood.
(a) Radio - The magnitude of the operation required that a multitude of circuits be guarded
placing a great load on men and equipment. It becomes necessary to place radiomen
on a watch and watch basis continuously when in the combat area.
(b) Visual - No remarks.
(c) Intercepts - Usual fading in the Philippine area was noted on the Fleet Broadcasts.
(d) TBS - The provision of various TBS channels for special forces or groups enabled more traffic to be cleared with loss interference. At times when use of frequencies below 50 megacycles were prohibited the fact that two meeting units might not be on the same TBS frequency brings forth a new identification problem. The old system of "Hello ______ this is _____ I have you bearing, etc., identify yourself." may not always work.
H. Smoke - No remarks.
I. Navigation - The approach charts were excellent for navigation and their use in succeeding operations is recommended.
J. Engineering. - No remarks.
K. Supply - No remarks.
7. Medical - No remarks
To Top Of Page
To Next Section of Final Action Report
To Previous Section of Final Action Report
||Recollections ||Ship's Poetry ||Sailors Lost ||Fletchers ||Glossary ||Links