PART II - Preliminaries
A. The BUSH with ComDesDiv 48 embarked, was operating as part of the FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R. A. Spruance, USN - Com5thFlt), in Task Force FIFTY-ONE (Vice-Admiral R. K. Turner, USN - ComPhibsPac) and was further assigned to Task Force FIFTY-FIVE (Rear-Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr., USN - ComPhibGroup 12) for duty in the screen of Task Unit 51.13.2, (Transport Group EASY, Commodore G. C. Richardson, USN ComTransron 14); commanded by ComDesDiv 126 (Captain C. A. Buchanan, USN in U.S.S. HYMAN). Upon arrival at the objective, BUSH reported for duty to CTG 51.5, Commander Transport Screen at the objective, (Captain F. Moosebrugger, USN, ComDesRon 63, in U.S.S. BISCAYNE, AGC 10. The ship remained a part of this task group until she was sunk. No attempt is made herein to include all vessels of the transport screen. Screening vessels included DD, DMS, DM, APD, DE, YMS, PC, etc., and all of which (were) assigned duties consistent with their capabilities.
B. Activities are described in detail in Part I.
C. BUSH was assigned to Radar Picket Station #1 on 1 April. The duties of the radar picket were to maintain alert air and surface radar and sound searches to give early warning of enemy forces attempting to enter the area; all unidentified and enemy contacts to be reported to CTF 51. Instructions called for each destroyer picket to be supported by two LCS(L). Information concerning contacts was to be exchanged with these supporting units to enable contact to be maintained. Destroyers were to patrol within a circle of 5,000 yard radius at 15 knots. Instructions called for opening fire on any enemy aircraft that closed within 12,000 yards range.
Omitted, see Introduction.
A. Performance of own ordnance, material, and equipment.
|1. Detailed information concerning:|
|(a) Ammunition expenditure.||Not known.|
|(b) Fire discipline, gunnery communications, radar fire control methods.||Fire discipline was excellent, communications excellent and effective at all times. Used partial radar control with good results. Handicapped by limitations of Mk. 4 radar equipment in night anti-aircraft firing. Had Mk. 12 and Mk. 22 radars been installed it is felt that better results would have been obtained in each case when enemy planes were taken under fire at night.|
|(c) Effectiveness of anti-aircraft gunnery.||Good until first crash caused loss of power.|
|(d) Material and training deficiencies.||No casualties to ordnance material. No training deficiencies noted. Performance of gun crews and fire control party excellent.|
B. Performance of enemy ordnance, material, and equipment.
C. No remarks.
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